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Abstract
I propose a new axiom on the aggregation of individual yes/no judgments on propo-
sitions into collective judgments: each collective judgment depends only on people’s
judgments on relevant propositions. This contrasts with classical independence: each
collective judgment depends only on people’s judgments on the current proposition.
I generalize the premise-based and sequential-priority rules to an arbitrary priority
structure over propositions, instead of a dichotomous premise/conclusion structure
or a linear order of priority. I prove four impossibility theorems on relevance-based
aggregation. One theorem simultaneously generalizes Arrow’s Theorem (in its general
and indiﬀerence-free versions) and the Arrow-type theorem in judgment aggregation.
Keywords: judgment aggregation, relevance connections vs. logical connections be-
tween issues, generalized Arrow theorem, premise-based rule, sequential priority rule,
general priority rule, priority graph, aggregation of non-binary evaluations
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1 Introduction
The judgment aggregation problem consists in merging many individuals’ judgments
(‘yes’ or ‘no’) on some interconnected propositions into collective judgments on these
propositions. Judgment aggregation (‘JA’) has wide applications. A classic example
is decision-making in a jury in court, where the jurors have to merge their judgments
on three controversial propositions: (i) the defendant has broken the contract; (ii)
the contract is legally valid; (iii) the defendant is guilty (e.g., Kornhauser and Sager
1986, List and Pettit 2002). These propositions are interconnected because legal
doctrine prescribes that (iii) holds if and only if (i) and (ii) both hold. Another
example is preference aggregation. Here we merge people’s judgments on propositions
of the kind ‘option x is weakly preferable to option y’ — in short: xRy — for various
pairs of options x and y (where these propositions are interconnected via conditions
such as transitivity). In yet another example, we merge people’s estimates of some
variables (such as GDP, prices and unemployment). In other words, we merge people’s
judgments on propositions of the sort ‘variable k takes value v’ for various pairs of a
1The paper has been completely rewritten since its 2006 version. It was presented at the Workshop
on Logic and Collective Decision Making (Lille, France, 2007), the Social Choice Colloquium (Tilburg
University, 2007), the Workshop on Judgment Aggregation (Karlsruhe University, 2007) and the
Economics Research Seminar (ETH Zurich, 2007).
variable k and a possible value v (where these propositions might be interconnected
via some macroeconomic equations). Similarly, we might merge grades which people
give to some politicians, where the possible grades might be ‘good’, ‘excellent’ and
‘bad’ (as in Balinski and Laraki’s 2010 voting theory). In other words, we merge
people’s judgments on propositions of the sort ‘politician k is of quality v’ for pairs
of a politician k and a possible grade v. The last two examples are versions of
the evaluation aggregation problem, in which we merge people’s positions on some
matters: people’s estimates of variables, people’s grades given to politicians, people’s
degrees of belief in some events, etc. (e.g., Rubinstein and Fishburn 1986, Dietrich
and List 2010b, Dokow and Holzman 2010b).
Evidently, many ‘special’ aggregation problems can be stated as JA problems — but
does JA theory have to say something interesting about them? JA theory has been
particularly successful at generalizing theorems and insights from preference aggre-
gation theory, including Arrow’s Theorem in its indiﬀerence-free version. JA theory
has been less successful at addressing some other aggregation problems, including
preference aggregation in its general (indiﬀerence-permitting) form, the aggregation
of (non-binary) evaluations, and the aggregation of judgments on propositions with
a more complex priority structure than a dichotomous premise/conclusion structure.
Perhaps the main reason is that JA theory draws strongly on the classic but controver-
sial axiom of proposition-wise independence: the collective judgment on a proposition
should be determined solely by people’s judgments on this proposition. This axiom
denies that other propositions can be relevant. I call a proposition p ‘relevant’ to an-
other q if people’s judgments on p matter for forming the collective judgment on q, so
that the latter should draw on the former. Proposition-wise independence implicitly
assumes a narrow notion of relevance: each proposition is relevant only to itself. The
implausibility of the axiom and its narrow relevance notion becomes evident in our
introductory examples:
(a) In the jury example, the popular premise-based procedure violates proposition-
wise independence and treats the two ‘premise propositions’ (i) and (ii) as rel-
evant to the ‘conclusion proposition’ (iii), since the collective judgment on (iii)
is derived from jurors’ judgments on (i) and (ii). (More precisely, the collective
endorses (iii) if and only if each premise proposition is endorsed by major-
ity.) There are many other examples of propositions between which there are
relevance connections of a premise-conclusion type, making proposition-wise
independence implausible.
(b) Now consider the preference agenda, whose propositions take the form xRy and
express betterness comparisons between options. Whether the proposition xRy
is collectively endorsed should be sensitive to people’s preferences between x
and y. Someone’s preference between x and y is captured by his judgments
on two propositions, xRy and yRx (for instance, indiﬀerence is captured by
‘yes’ judgments on both xRy and yRx). So the propositions xRy and yRx
are both relevant to xRy. Yet proposition-wise independence prevents people’s
judgments on yRx (‘yes’ or ‘no’) from aﬀecting the social judgment on xRy
— with absurd consequences.2 This makes the axiom implausible and much
2A collective acceptance of xRy can never be reversed if everyone who strictly prefers x to y (i.e.,
accepts xRy but not yRx) suddenly becomes indiﬀerent (i.e., accepts both xRy and yRx). This is
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stronger than Arrow’s axiom of ‘independence of irrelevant alternatives’. Both
axioms become equivalent only after excluding indiﬀerences.
(c) Finally, consider the evaluation agenda for a group in search of ‘positions’ on
some ‘matters’ (e.g., estimates of some variables, grades of some politicians,
etc.). It is natural to construct the collective position on a matter from peo-
ple’s positions on this matter: the collective estimate of a variable might be an
arithmetic average of people’s estimates of this variable; the collective grade of
a politician might be this politician’s median grade; and so on. Such aggre-
gation rules satisfy a matter-wise independence axiom: the collective position
on a matter depends only on people’s positions on this matter. But they vio-
late proposition-wise independence: if for instance politician Smith’s collective
grade is his median grade, then the collective judgment (yes or no) on whether
‘he is good’ depends not just on people’s judgments on this proposition, but
on people’s judgments on all propositions about Smith (‘he is good’, ‘he is ex-
cellent’, and so on for other grades). Requiring proposition-wise independence
would be utterly implausible.
So far, JA theory faces an all-or-nothing dilemma. Either it accepts proposition-
wise independence, which eliminates many plausible aggregation rules and leads into
impossibility results. Or it drops the axiom and is left with too many possibilities and
no systematic way to prevent irrelevant information from playing a role. In response,
I enrich the JA framework by a ‘relevance’ relation R between propositions, where
pRq represents relevance of p to (the collective judgment on) q. I replace proposition-
wise independence by independence of irrelevant propositions (‘IIP’): the collective
judgment on a proposition depends solely on people’s judgments on propositions
relevant to it. There are many interpretations and applications. In the ‘classical’
case, each proposition is deemed relevant just to itself: pRq ⇔ p = q. So IIP reduces
to proposition-wise independence. For less narrow relevance notions, IIP becomes
weaker and more plausible. For instance, relevance of p to q could mean that p is
a premise/argument/reason for or against q, as is the case in (a). Such a relevance
relation is acyclic (‘no priority cycles’). The corresponding axiom IIP represents the
condition of premise-based aggregation. Alternatively, relevance of p to q could mean
that p and q pertain to the same semantic ﬁeld, topic or matter. Such a relevance
relation is an equivalence relation. An example is the relevance relation indicated in
(b) for the preference agenda: it reﬂects Arrow’s notion of (ir)relevance and renders
IIP equivalent to Arrow’s axiom of ‘independence of irrelevant alternatives’. Another
example is the relevance relation indicated in (c) for the evaluation agenda: here, IIP
requires matter-wise independent aggregation, for instance by taking people’s average
or median position on each matter.
Overview of the ﬁndings in the context of the literature. After deﬁning
the judgment aggregation framework (in the version of List and Pettit 2002 and
Dietrich 2007, 2014) and adding the relevance notion (Sections 2 and 3), I explore
relevance-based aggregation from a constructive perspective (Section 4) and then an
axiomatic perspective (Sections 5-9). In Section 4, the relevance relation is taken
to capture premisehood (priority) and to deﬁne an (acyclic) ‘priority graph’ over
the propositions. This leads to priority rules: aggregation rules which decide on the
counterintuitive.
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propositions in an order of priority imposed by the priority graph, where each decision
is constrained by the prior decisions. Such rules generalize List’s (2004) sequential
priority rules, which are based on a linear priority order rather than a general priority
graph. Theorem 1 gives suﬃcient conditions for priority rules to be ‘well-behaved’.
Later, Sections 5-9 focus on impossibility theorems in an Arrovian tradition. I
ﬁrst introduce a unanimity condition — unambiguous agreement preservation — which
focuses on ‘non-spurious’ agreements, in which people agree not just on a judgment,
but also on the ‘reasons’. The axiom turns out to generalize Arrow’s weak Pareto prin-
ciple. I prove four impossibility theorems that give suﬃcient conditions under which
our new independence and unanimity axioms imply that aggregation is degenerate.
The theorems diﬀer in the notion of ‘degenerate’. One theorem generalizes Arrow’s
Theorem in its general version and its indiﬀerence-free version, since Arrow’s The-
orem arises when choosing the preference agenda (in its general or indiﬀerence-free
version). Our theorem also generalizes the known Arrow-type theorem in judgment
aggregation (see Dietrich and List 2007b and Dokow and Holzman 2010a, both build-
ing on Nehring and Puppe 2002/2010 and strengthening Wilson 1975). The latter
theorem arises when choosing the (narrow) classical relevance notion. This known
theorem already generalizes Arrow’s Theorem in its indiﬀerence-free version.3 It
does so tightly, i.e., under maximally general assumptions (see Dokow and Holzman
2010a). Tightness of results has become an important goal ever since Nehring and
Puppe (2002/2010). Our theorems are all tight in the special case of the classical
relevance relation (where our new independence axiom reduces to the classical one).
But they are not tight in general.
In sum, weakening classical independence opens up new possibilities (such as prior-
ity rules), but does not generally free us from impossibility. It is of course well-known
that classical independence is very hard to satisfy: besides the cited Arrow-type im-
possibility theorem, see for instance the impossibility theorems in List and Pettit
(2002), Pauly and van Hees (2006), Dietrich (2006a), Gärdenfors (2006), Mongin
(2008), Nehring and Puppe (2002/2010, 2008), Dietrich and List (2007a, 2008, 2013),
Dokow and Holzman (2010c), Nehring (2005) and Dietrich and Mongin (2010). The
classical independence axiom is often criticised (e.g., Chapman 2002, Mongin 2008),
but rarely weakened. All weaker independence axioms in the literature — such as
independence axioms restricted to premise propositions (Dietrich 2006, Dietrich and
Mongin 2010) or to atomic propositions (Mongin 2008) — are special cases of our
independence axiom: they arise for special choices of the relevance relation. It is also
worth mentioning Dokow and Holzman’s (2010b) impossibility theorem on matter-
wise independent aggregation of non-binary evaluations. Although matter-wise in-
dependence is a special case of our independence axiom, their impossibility theorem
is not generalized by our ones (partly because the unanimity axioms do not match).
A growing branch of the judgment aggregation literature gives up proposition-wise
independence altogether rather than weakening it. This includes the distance-based
approach (e.g., Konieszni and Pino-Perez 2002, Pigozzi 2006, Miller and Osherson
2008, Hartmann et al. 2010, Lang et al. 2011), the sequential approach (e.g., List
2004, Dietrich and List 2007a), Borda-type and scoring-based rules (Zwicker 2011,
3Arrow’s Theorem in its general version has so far no judgment-aggregation counterpart. But it
was proved as a corollary of a judgment-aggregation theorem in Dokow and Holzman (2010c).
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Dietrich 2014, Duddy, Piggins and Zwicker 2014), and ‘approximately majoritarian’
rules (Nehring, Pivato and Puppe 2011).
2 The judgment aggregation framework
A group of n ≥ 2 individuals, labelled 1, ..., n, has to form collective judgments on
some interconnected propositions.
The agenda. The set of propositions under consideration is the agenda. It is subdi-
vided into issues, i.e., pairs of opposite proposition, such as ‘it will rain’ and ‘it won’t
rain’. Writing ‘¬’ for negation, the agenda thus takes the formX = {p,¬p, p′,¬p′, ...},
with issues {p,¬p}, {p′,¬p′}, ... An individual rationally accepts one proposition from
each issue (‘completeness’) and respects any logical interconnections (‘consistency’).
Formally:
Deﬁnition 1 An agenda is a non-empty set X (of ‘propositions’) which is
(a) partitioned into binary ‘issues’ {p, q} (p and q are the ‘negations’ of each other,
written p = ¬q and q = ¬p),
(b) endowed with interconnections, i.e., a speciﬁcation of which judgment sets are
rational, or formally, a system J of (‘rational’) judgment sets J ⊆ X, each
containing exactly one member of any issue,
where (in this paper) X is tautology-free, i.e., no p ∈ X belongs to all J ∈ J .4
Given an agenda X, we ﬁx a subset X0 ⊆ X containing exactly one member of
each pair p,¬p (no matter which one). So X = {p,¬p : p ∈ X0}. I often write
‘±p’ for ‘p,¬p’, and use the term ‘issue’ for both ±p and {±p}. In examples, the
agenda is often speciﬁed syntactically, writing propositions as logical sentences and
using the logical notions of negation and interconnections. Simple (syntactic) agendas
are X = {±a,±b,±(a ∧ b)} and X = {±a,±b,±c,±(c ↔ (a ∧ b)}, where a, b, c are
(logically independent) atomic propositions such as, in a jury decision problem, ‘the
defendant has broken the contract’, ‘the contract is legally valid’ and ‘the defendant is
liable’.5 (Agendas can also be speciﬁed semantically, taking propositions to be events
included in a set of possible worlds, and using the set-theoretic notions of negation
and interconnections.)
Individual judgments. The judgment set of an individual is the set J ⊆ X
of ‘accepted’ or ‘believed’ propositions. It is complete if it contains a member of
each issue {p,¬p}, and consistent if it is a subset of a rational judgment set. So a
judgment set is rational (i.e., in J ) just in case it is both consistent and complete. A
proposition p ∈ X (or set S ⊆ X) entails a proposition q ∈ X — written p ⊢ q (resp.
S ⊢ q) — in case, for every rational judgment set J ∈ J , if p ∈ J (resp. S ⊆ J), then
q ∈ J .
4Formally, the agenda is the structure X ≡ (X, I,J ) where I is the set of issues (or equivalently,
the structure X ≡ (X,¬,J ) where ¬ is the negation operator on X).
5The logic in which propositions are expressed could take many forms: classical or non-classical
(e.g., a modal logic), propositional or non-propositional (i.e., a predicate logic). The logic should
satisfy standard regularity conditions, especially monotonicity. See Dietrich (2007).
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Aggregation. An aggregation rule is a function F that assigns to every proﬁle
(J1, . . . , Jn) of ‘individual’ judgment sets (from some domain of admissible proﬁles)
a ‘collective’ judgment set F (J1, . . . , Jn) ⊆ X. An example is majority rule, given by
F (J1, ..., Jn) = {p ∈ X : |{i : p ∈ Ji}| > n/2} for all (J1, ..., Jn) ∈ J
n.
In this paper, the domain of the aggregation rule is always J n, i.e., any rational
inputs are admissible. If outputs are also rational, F is a function F : J n → J .
More generally, F is a function F : J n → 2X with possibly inconsistent or incomplete
outputs. Majority rule notoriously generates inconsistent outputs.
I now give two important examples; other ones will follow in the next section.
Example 1: aggregating strict or general preferences. I now deﬁne the pref-
erence agenda in two versions: for strict preferences (excluding indiﬀerences) and
general preferences (allowing indiﬀerences). While the literature has addressed the
strict version (e.g., List and Pettit 2004, Dietrich and List 2007b, Dokow and Holz-
man 2010a), the current paper has implications for both versions. Consider a set of
two or more alternatives A.
• The strict preference agenda for the set of alternatives A is the set of sen-
tences X = {xPy : x, y ∈ A,x = y}, where xPy reads ‘x is (strictly) better
than y’ and where by deﬁnition ¬xPy = yPx. The interconnections are deﬁned
by the usual conditions on strict preferences. Formally, judgment sets J ⊆ X
can be identiﬁed with (irreﬂexive) binary relation ≻ on A via the equivalence
x ≻ y ⇔ xPy ∈ J for x = y; and so we may apply relation-theoretic notions like
transitivity to judgment sets. J is the set of all transitive, anti-symmetric and
connected judgment sets J ⊆ X. So rational judgment sets J ∈ J represent
strict linear orders on A.
• The general (or weak) preference agenda for the set of alternatives A is
the set of sentences X = {xRy,¬xRy : x, y ∈ A, x = y}, where xRy reads ‘x is
weakly better than y’. This agenda has twice the size of the strict preference
agenda, as ¬xRy = yRx, whereas for the strict preference agenda ¬xPy = yPx.
While ¬xRy cannot be replaced by yRx, I will sometimes write ‘yPx’ for ¬xRy
(reﬂecting the equivalence between preferring y to x and not weakly preferring
x to y). The interconnections within the general preference agenda are deﬁned
by the usual rationality conditions on weak preferences. Formally, we can apply
relation-theoretic notions like transitivity to judgment sets J ⊆ X, as each
J ⊆ X induces a (reﬂexive) binary relation  on A via x  y ⇔ xRy ∈ J for
x = y. Now J is the set of all judgment sets (containing exactly one member of
each issue xRy,¬xRy) which are transitive and connected. So rational judgment
sets represent weak orders on A.
Example 2: aggregating evaluations. Consider the aggregation of people’s (pos-
sibly non-binary) positions on some matters or issues (e.g., Rubinstein and Fishburn
1986, Dietrich and List 2010b, Dokow and Holzman 2010b). As will be seen, this
non-binary aggregation problem can be represented in the binary judgment aggrega-
tion framework. Given sets K of ‘matters’ and V of possible ‘positions’ or ‘values’
(where |K| ≥ 1 and |V | ≥ 2), an evaluation is a function E : K → V assigning a
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position to each matter, or equivalently a family (vk)k∈K in V
K . (One might write
K and V as K = {1, ...,m} and V = {0, 1, ..., l} in the ﬁnite case.) For instance,
K contains political candidates and V possible grades of candidates; or K contains
macroeconomic variables (GDP, inﬂation, etc.) and V ⊆ R; or K contains animal
species and V possible sizes of species; or K contains sentences and V truth values
in binary or many-valued logic. Not every evaluation counts as coherent, because of
interconnections between matters: macroeconomic variables must obey certain equa-
tions, animal species cannot all be extinct, etc. Let E ⊆ V K be the non-empty set of
‘coherent ’ evaluations. To study the aggregation of coherent evaluations as a (binary)
judgment aggregation problem, consider the agenda
X = {±vk : k ∈ K,v ∈ V } (the evaluation agenda)
where vk denotes the proposition ‘v is the value on matter k’.
6 To each evaluation
E : K → V corresponds a unique judgment set JE ⊆ X, containing those vk with
E(k) = v and those ¬vk with E(k) = v. A judgment set is rational just in case it
corresponds to a coherent evaluation: J = {JE : E ∈ E}.
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Evaluation aggregation has so far not been addressed within (binary) judgment
aggregation theory. But it has been analysed in other frameworks, and for many
kinds of evaluation.8
3 Relevance and a new independence axiom
I aim to overcome the following controversial independence axiom, which parallels
Arrow’s ‘independence of irrelevant alternatives’ and has led to many impossibility
results.
Proposition-wise Independence: For all propositions p ∈ X and all proﬁles
(J1, ..., Jn) and (J
′
1, ..., J
′
n) in the domain, if p ∈ Ji ⇔ p ∈ J
′
i for every individual
i then p ∈ F (J1, ..., Jn)⇔ p ∈ F (J
′
1, ..., J
′
n).
This axiom forbids that the collective judgment on p depends on people’s judg-
ments on other propositions. However, often some other propositions are relevant to
p, so that people’s judgments on them should not be ignored. For instance, whether
country X violates human rights seems relevant to whether sanctions against coun-
try X should be imposed. Other examples follow shortly. There are many possible
6For simplicity, I use the symbol ‘vk’ both for a proposition vk ∈ X and a position vk = E(k) ∈ V .
7 In a generalized version of Example 2, the set of possible positions is matter-dependent, so that
V is replaced by sets Vk (k ∈ K). One matter might consist in estimating a real-valued quantity
(Vk = R), another in answering a yes/no question (Vk = {yes, no}), and so on.
8For instance, the literature on probabilistic opinion pooling deals with aggregating probability
functions, i.e., evaluations in which ‘matters’ are events and ‘positions’ are subjective probabilities
(e.g., Genest and Zidek 1986). Other contributions on (non-binary) evaluation aggregation are made
by Rubinstein and Fishburn (1986) (who prove a general result on linear aggregation), Claussen
and Roisland (2010) (who study a non-binary version of the discursive dilemma), Dietrich and List
(2010b) (who seek to unify diﬀerent aggregation problems), Dokow and Holzman (2010b) (who prove
a general impossibility result), and Pauly and van Hees (2006) and Duddy and Piggins (2013) (who
all study the aggregation of multi-valued logical judgments).
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interpretations of ‘relevance’ of q to p: it could for instance mean that q is semanti-
cally related to p, or that q is a premise of p. I capture relevance connections by a
binary relation R on the agenda X, where qRp reads ‘q is relevant to p’. The set of
propositions relevant to p ∈ X is denoted
R(p) := {r ∈ X : rRp}.
Often relevance does not distinguish between a proposition and its negation, i.e., is
negation-invariant: qRp⇔ q′Rp′ if q′ ∈ {±q} and p′ ∈ {±p}. (1)
Then R is equivalent to a relation on the set of issues (rather than propositions), or
on the set X0. The informal talk will reﬂect this. Under negation-invariance, I often
write R(±p) to denote both R(p) and R(¬p) (and to imply that R(p) = R(¬p)).
The new independence axiom requires collective judgments to depend only on
people’s judgments on relevant propositions:
Independence of Irrelevant Propositions (IIP): For all propositions p ∈ X and
all proﬁles (J1, ..., Jn) and (J
′
1, ..., J
′
n) in the domain, if Ji∩R(p) = J
′
i∩R(p) for every
individual i then p ∈ F (J1, ..., Jn)⇔ p ∈ F (J ′1, ..., J
′
n).
Remark 1: IIP is weaker than proposition-wise independence as long asR is reﬂexive
(self-relevance), and equivalent to it for ‘classical’ relevance given by R(p) = {p}.
So, proposition-wise independence is a special case of IIP, with classical rel-
evance. As another example, consider premise-based aggregation for the agenda
X = {±a,±b,±(a ∧ b)} with premise propositions ±a,±b and conclusion proposi-
tions ±(a∧b). The decisions on ±a and ±b are made by two separate majority votes,
and the decision on ±(a ∧ b) is deduced logically from the decisions on ±a and ±b.
This rule satisﬁes IIP if premises are deemed relevant to conclusions, i.e., if
R(±a) = {±a}, R(±b) = {±b}, R(±(a ∧ b)) = {±a,±b}. (2)
In full generality, a relevance relation R need not satisfy any particular relation-
theoretic conditions such as transitivity or reﬂexivity. However I shall assume non-
underdetermination: every proposition is settled by the judgments on the relevant
propositions, i.e., for every p ∈ X and every consistent set S of the form {q∗ : q ∈
R(p)}, where each q∗ is q or ¬q,
• either S entails p (S is then called an (R-)explanation of p)
• or S entails ¬p (S is then called an (R-)refutation of p).
This condition is plausible. It holds automatically if R is reﬂexive (‘self-relevance’).
It also holds for the agenda {±a,±b,±(a∧b)} with relevance given by (2). Here, each
premise proposition p ∈ {±a,±b} has a single explanation {p} (and a single refutation
{¬p}), a∧b has a single explanation {a, b}, and ¬(a∧b) has three explanations {a,¬b},
{¬a, b} and {¬a,¬b}.9 Let me summarize our deﬁnitions:
9 In the paper’s earlier version Dietrich (2006), I argue that cases of underdetermination usually
stem from having misspeciﬁed R; and I show that non-underdetermination is indispensable since
otherwise no aggregation rule F on J n can satisfy IIP and a mild unanimity condition (requiring
F (J, ..., J) = J for all J ∈ J ).
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Deﬁnition 2 A relevance relation is a binary relation R on the agenda X sat-
isfying non-underdetermination (I write R(p) := {q : qRp}). If it is negation-
invariant, then it is identiﬁed with a relation on X0 or on the set of issues (and
I write R(±p) := R(p) = R(¬p)).
Deﬁnition 3 The classical relevance relation is the one given by qRp ⇔ q = p,
i.e., by R(p) = {p}.
Many informational constraints in social choice theory are instances of IIP relative
to some relevance relation. Roughly, the more relevance connections there are, the
weaker IIP becomes. IIP is vacuous if everything is relevant to everything, i.e., if
R = X × X. IIP is proposition-wise independence for classical relevance. IIP is
Gärdenfors’ (2006) ‘weak ’ proposition-wise independence if R(p) = {±p} for all p ∈
X. IIP is Dietrich’s (2006a) independence on premises — the restriction of proposition-
wise independence to a subset Y ⊆ X of ‘premises’ — if R(p) = {p} for p ∈ Y and
R(p) = X for p ∈ X\Y . IIP is Mongin’s (2008) independence on atomic propositions
if R(p) = {p} for syntactically atomic propositions p and R(p) = X for syntactically
compound propositions p (like a ∧ b).
I now give further examples of (negation-invariant) relevance relations.
Example 1 continued. Arrow’s condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives
(‘IIA’) is equivalent to IIP, where we adopt the ‘Arrovian’ relevance relation, which
is implicit in IIA and is deﬁned as follows, depending on whether indiﬀerences are
allowed:
• In the case of the strict preference agenda, Arrovian relevance is deﬁned by
R(±xPy) = {±xPy} for all xPy ∈ X. (3)
• In the case of the general preference agenda, Arrovian relevance is deﬁned by
R(±xRy) = {±xRy,±yRx} for all xRy ∈ X. (4)
The slight asymmetry between (3) and (4) is only apparent, since in (3) we have
{±xPy} = {±xPy,±yPx} (because ¬xPy = yPx and ¬yPx = xPy). In (4) it
matters that R(±xRy) contains not just ±xRy, but also ±yRx, since an individual’s
judgments on both of these issues are needed to capture how he ranks x relative to
y, i.e., whether he prefers x, prefers y, or is indiﬀerent.
Example 2 continued. For the evaluation agenda X = {±vk : k ∈ K, v ∈ V },
where vk represents position v on matter k, one might view vk as relevant to each
proposition v′k concerning the same matter k, but irrelevant to any proposition v
′
k′
concerning another matter k′ = k. Formally:
R(±vk) = {±v
′
k : v
′ ∈ V }. (5)
Example 3: relevance as an equivalence relation which partitions the
agenda into topics. In many cases including Examples 1 and 2, relevance is an
equivalence relation: R is reﬂexive (‘self-relevance’), symmetric, and transitive. So
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the agenda X is partitioned into equivalence classes of inter-relevant propositions. If
one interprets each such relevance class as a topic, then IIP requires topic-wise (rather
than proposition-wise) aggregation. One topic might deal with weather, another with
the economy, and so on. A topic can be as small as a single issue {±p} or much larger.
The general preference agenda in Example 1 has topics of the form {±xRy,±yRx}
(the topic of comparing x and y). In Example 2, topics correspond to matters in K.
Example 4: relevance as an acyclic relation representing priority/premisehood.
I now interpret ‘qRp’ as ‘q is a premise/reason/argument for (or against) p’. To make
sense of this interpretation, I exclude priority cycles. Formally, R is a negation-
invariant relevance relation without cycles of issues; it is referred to as a ‘priority
graph’ (see Deﬁnition 4). IIP then represents the condition of premise-based aggre-
gation: the collective judgment on any proposition p ∈ X is determined by people’s
reasons for or against p. This generalizes classical premise-based aggregation, which
a b
a∧b
(a∧ b)→ c
c
a b
a∧b a→ ¬c
. . . .
.
.
.
.
a→ ba
b
..
Figure 1: Priority graphs on four agendas. Arrows indicate relevance (priority).
Agenda 1: X0 = {a, b, a ∧ b}. Agenda 2: X0 = {a, a → b, b}. Agenda 3: X0 =
{a, b, c, a ∧ b, (a ∧ b)→ c, a→ ¬c}. Agenda 4: X0 contains 10 propositions indicated
by "·".
has only two levels of priority, ‘premises’ and ‘conclusions’, as in the ﬁrst and second
agenda of Figure 1. By allowing an arbitrary priority structure, I permit ‘premises
of premises’ and many other interesting constellations. A premise-based — that is,
IIP — aggregation rule can be thought of as being a sequential procedure, which ﬁrst
decides on the roots of the priority graph (the ‘basic premises’), and then works itself
forward along each branch of the graph. Let me be more concrete. I call p ∈ X a root
proposition and ±p a root issue if p has no external premise, i.e., R(±p) = {±p}.
For instance, a and b are root propositions in the ﬁrst priority graph of Figure 1. By
IIP, root issues ±p are settled by a vote on the issue, ignoring other issues. In this
sense, root issues must be decided ﬁrst. Decisions on non-root issues ±p must come
later because — to ensure collective rationality — they must respect the decisions on
root issues and other prior issues. If the prior decisions impose no logical constraint
on the current issue ±p — for instance, if for the second agenda in Figure 1 the deci-
sions on the two root issues are ¬a and ¬(a→ b), which have no logical implication
for the issue ±b — then there is some freedom in how to settle the current issue.
All the premise-based approach (i.e., IIP) requires here is that the current issue ±p
be decided based on people’s judgments on the premises R(±p). This can be done
in many ways. One route is to base the decision on ±p on people’s judgments on
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±p (and thereby indirectly on their judgments on R(±p)10), for instance by taking
a majority vote on ±p. This route is taken by ‘priority rules’, studied in the next
section.
4 Priority rules relative to a priority graph
This section follows Example 4’s interpretation of relevance as priority/premisehood,
so that IIP requires premise-based aggregation. I again assume that relevance deﬁnes
a ‘priority graph’. This notion is now deﬁned formally:
Deﬁnition 4 A priority graph is a negation-invariant relevance relation R which
is acyclic as a relation over issues, i.e., there are no p1, ..., pm ∈ X (m ≥ 2) from
distinct issues such that p1Rp2R· · · pmRp1.
I now introduce priority rules relative to a priority graph, where X is ﬁnite for
simplicity.11 They generalize List’s (2004) sequential priority rules, which are deﬁned
relative to a linear order of issues — a ‘linear priority graph’ — and decide the issues
one by one in order of diminishing priority: the decision on any issue is either deduced
from past decisions or made by voting on the current issue, depending on whether
past decisions logically constrain the current decision. Linear priority graphs are of
course a very special case. In applications, priority is often non-linear. For instance,
two issues can be on a par, so that neither has priority over the other (as for the two
‘premise issues’ ±a and ±b in our example agenda {±a,±b,±(a ∧ b)}).
A priority rule relative to an arbitrary priority graph begins by a vote on every
root issue (of maximal priority). Next, one considers each issue of second-highest
priority, to which only root issues (and possibly the present issue) are relevant: if
the past decisions on relevant root issues imply some decision on the current issue,
then this decision is adopted mechanically; otherwise a local vote is taken on the
present issue, neglecting other issues. And so on for other issues. When taking a
local vote on an issue ±p, the group uses a local decision method for p, i.e., an
aggregation rule for the one-issue agenda {±p} given by a function Dp : J ′n → J ′
where J ′ = {{p}, {¬p}}. Dp could for instance be majority voting. In sum, the group
judgment set J ⊆ X is constructed step-by-step by forming group judgment sets J(p)
for the various one-issue agendas {±p} ⊆ X , and then taking their union. To state
the deﬁnition formally, recall that X0 ⊆ X contains one proposition from each issue.
Deﬁnition 5 A priority rule (relative to a priority graph R on a ﬁnite agenda
X) is an aggregation rule F = F(Dp)p∈X0 on J
n which is given by some local deci-
sion methods (Dp)p∈X0 (one per proposition in X0, i.e., per issue) as follows: for
every proﬁle (J1, ..., Jn) ∈ J n, F (J1, ..., Jn) := ∪p∈X0J(p), where the set J(p) ⊆
{±p} (representing the decision on ±p) is deﬁned recursively from the set J<(p) :=
∪q∈X0:q∈R(p)\{p}J(q) (representing prior decisions) via
J(p) :=

{p˜ ∈ {±p} : J<(p) entails p˜} if J<(p) entails a p˜ ∈ {±p}
Dp(J1 ∩ {±p}, ..., Jn ∩ {±p}) if J<(p) entails no p˜ ∈ {±p}.
(6)
10as people’s judgments on R(±p) determine their judgments on ±p by non-underdetermination
11See the paper’s original version Dietrich (2006) for the inﬁnite case.
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How are the sets J(p) constructed? Note ﬁrst that they are recursively well-
deﬁned, as the priority graph is an acyclic and ﬁnite, and thus well-founded relation
on issues (see the well-founded recursion theorem, e.g., Fenstad 1980). The (initial)
decision on each root proposition p ∈ X0 is always made by voting on ±p, as J<(p) =
∅. Later decisions on non-root propositions p ∈ X0 are made either by entailment
from the past judgments J<(p) or by a vote on ±p, depending on whether J<(p)
settles p. Note that the construction of F (J1, ..., Jn) in Deﬁnition 5 can be restated
without introducing the sets J(p): F (J1, ..., Jn) is the unique set J ⊆ X such that
for all p ∈ X0
J ∩ {±p} =

{p˜ ∈ {±p} : J ∩R(p)\{±p} entails p˜} if this set is non-empty
Dp(J1 ∩ {±p}, ..., Jn ∩ {±p}) otherwise.
(7)
The local rules Dp may all be the same rule, e.g., majority voting. Alternatively, Dp
could depend on who has expertise on the present proposition p (physicists might have
expertise on physical propositions), or on who is personally aﬀected by the decision
on p (citizens of Brighten are aﬀected by decisions on urban planning for Brighton).12
When are priority rules well-behaved, i.e., satisfy IIP and generate logically con-
sistent outputs? The following theorem gives suﬃcient conditions. Let me motivate
them ﬁrst.
• Do priority rules satisfy IIP? This question is related to whetherR is transitive.
To see why, note that if pRq and qRr, then people’s judgments on p could aﬀect
the group decision on r (via the group decisions on p and q), assuming these
three propositions are logically interconnected. By Theorem 1, transitivity of
R is suﬃcient for IIP. (This is true even in the absence of reﬂexivity, although
one might at ﬁrst think that violations of IIP can occur when deciding on a
self-irrelevant proposition using a local vote.)
• Do priority rules generate consistent decisions? This depends on two factors.
First, transitivity of R once again matters. To get an intuition, note that if
pRq and qRr but not pRr, then, after the group has decided on p and q, it
decides on r by respecting the decision on q (as q ∈ R(r)), but without giving
any attention to the decision on p (as p ∈ R(r)) — which threatens collective
consistency. Second, collective consistency is also threatened by logical con-
nections between diﬀerent (mutually irrelevant) branches of the priority graph,
intuitively because the decisions in one branch ignore those in other branches
(by mutual irrelevance), even if there are logical connections. Theorem 1 shows
that collective consistency is guaranteed if R is transitive and certain kinds of
logical connections are excluded.
Before stating the theorem, recall that negation-closed sets S1, ..., Sm ⊆ X are logically
independent if any consistent subsets J1 ⊆ S1, ..., Jm ⊆ Sm have a consistent union.
This condition fails trivially if two of the sets Si overlap, as one can then pick con-
sistent subsets whose union contains a pair p,¬p. To exclude such trivial cases, I call
S1, ..., Sm logically quasi-independent if any consistent subsets J1 ⊆ S1, ..., Jm ⊆ Sm
have a consistent union as long as this union contains no pair p,¬p (equivalently, if
any set S ⊆ S1 ∪· · ·∪Sm is consistent whenever each restriction S ∩Si is consistent).
12Dp might be majority voting among a particular subgroup of experts on p, as in a distributed
premise-based procedure (see List 2005).
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Theorem 1 All priority rules (relative to a priority graph R on a ﬁnite agenda X)
(a) satisfy IIP (i.e., are premise-based rules) if R is transitive;
(b) generate rational outcomes if R is transitive and for all pairwise irrelevant
propositions p1, ..., pm ∈ X the setsR(p1), ...,R(pm) are logically quasi-independent.
It is worth considering Theorem 1 for two special priority graphs:
• If the priority graph deﬁnes a linear order over issues, Theorem 1’s conditions (of
transitivity and logical quasi-independence) hold trivially. So Theorem 1 implies
that List’s (2004) sequential priority rules satisfy IIP and (as is known) generate
rational outcomes. To see why the logical quasi-independence condition holds,
note that linearity implies that for any p1, ..., pm ∈ X we may assume without
loss of generality that p1Rp2R· · ·Rpm, so that R(p1) ⊆ R(p2) ⊆ · · · ⊆ R(pm).
• Now assume the (degenerate) priority graph in which each issue is only relevant
to itself (R(±p) = {±p}). Then Theorem 1’s transitivity assumption holds
trivially, and the logical quasi-independence condition reduces to the condition
that all issues in X are mutually independent, i.e., that there are no logical
interconnections whatsoever between issues. For this priority graph, Theorem
1 is tight, i.e., minimal in its assumptions, as an anonymous referee kindly
pointed out.13 But tightness fails for some other priority graphs. For instance,
in the absence of any logical interconnections between issues, transitivity is not
needed in (b), since rationality of outcomes is guaranteed.
Finally, Theorem 1’s logical quasi-independence condition reduces to a logical
independence condition under a simple structural condition on the priority graph:
no proposition is relevant to two mutually irrelevant propositions (so that the sets
R(p1), ...,R(pm) in Theorem 1 must be pairwise disjoint). This condition holds for
the ﬁrst three graphs of Figure 1.
5 A new unanimity axiom restricted to unambiguous
agreements
We now turn to the axiomatic analysis of relevance-based aggregation. IIP cannot
be our only axiom: it fails to exclude constant rules, which totally neglect people’s
judgments. The usual strategy is to impose a unanimity condition, typically by
requiring preservation of all unanimous judgments:
Unanimity Principle: For every proﬁle (J1, ..., Jn) in the domain and every propo-
sition p ∈ X, if p ∈ Ji for all individuals i then p ∈ F (J1, ..., Jn).
This axiom is not very natural under the relevance-based approach: why should
people’s judgments on the propositions relevant to p suddenly not matter? Even if
everyone agrees on p, there can be much disagreement on relevant propositions. Such
‘spurious agreements’ — agreements with disagreements on the ‘reasons’ — are often
believed to lack normative force (e.g., Mongin 2005, Nehring 2005, Bradley 2006).
Note however that spurious agreements are impossible on those propositions which
can be justiﬁed (explained) in only one way. I call such propositions ‘unambiguous’:
13To see why the absence of logical interconnections is necessary for part (b)’s consistency conclu-
sion, note that only the second case in (6) ever applies as J<(p) is always empty.
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Deﬁnition 6 Given the relevance relationR, a proposition in X is (R-)unambiguous
if it has only one explanation, and (R-)ambiguous otherwise. The set of unambigu-
ous propositions is denoted UR.
In our example agenda X = {±a,±b,±(a ∧ b)} with relevance given by (2),
UR = X\{¬(a ∧ b)}. Proposition ¬(a ∧ b) is ambiguous as it has three explanations:
{¬a, b}, {a,¬b} and {¬a,¬b}. So an agreement on ¬(a∧b) can be spurious. The new
unanimity axiom is restricted to unambiguous propositions, hence, to non-spurious
agreements:
Unambiguous Agreement Preservation (UAP): For every proﬁle (J1, ..., Jn) in
the domain and every unambiguous proposition p ∈ UR, if p ∈ Ji for all individuals
i then p ∈ F (J1, ..., Jn).
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Remark 2: UAP is equivalent to the classical (global) unanimity principle under
the classical relevance relation, as UR = X. In sum, both of our axioms — IIP and
UAP — reduce to their classical counterparts under classical relevance.
Example 1 continued. For the preference agenda in its strict or general version
(with Arrovian relevance), UAP is equivalent to the weak Pareto principle, which
requires preserving unanimous strict betterness judgments. This is because the un-
ambiguous propositions are precisely the propositions expressing strict betterness
comparisons:
• For the strict preference agenda, all propositions in X express strict betterness
comparisons, and indeed UR = X since each proposition xPy ∈ X has a single
explanation, {xPy}.
• For the general preference agenda, only the propositions inX of the form yPx :=
¬xRy express strict betterness comparisons, and indeed
UR = {¬xRy : x, y ∈ A,x = y} = {yPx : x, y ∈ A,x = y} (8)
since each ¬xRy ∈ X has a single explanation, {¬xRy, yRx}, while each xRy ∈
X has two explanations, {xRy, yRx} and {xRy,¬yRx}.
Example 2 continued. Consider the evaluation agenda X = {±vk : k ∈ K,v ∈ V }
with the ‘matter-wise’ relevance relation (5). Each vk ∈ X has only one explanation
({vk} ∪ {¬v
′
k : v
′ ∈ V \{v}}) and each ¬vk ∈ X has |V | − 1 explanations (of the form
{wk} ∪ {¬w
′
k : w
′ ∈ V \{w}} with w ∈ V \{v}). So, as long as |V | > 2, the set of
unambiguous propositions is
UR = {vk : k ∈ K,v ∈ V }. (9)
Here UAP is far more plausible than the (global) unanimity principle: requiring to
preserve a unanimously endorsed proposition ¬vk ∈ X\UR strikes as implausible,
because the position v could be a good compromise although no-one holds it.
14 In a generalization of UAP, p ranges not over UR but over a given subset P ⊆ UR of ‘privileged’
propositions. All following theorems survive this generalization: see the paper’s unpublished version
Dietrich (2006).
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6 Three impossibility theorems and Arrow’s Theorem in
both versions as special cases
Are there appealing aggregation rules satisfying our two axioms, IIP and UAP? Gen-
eral answers to this question are harder to give than for classical axioms, because
we have to address not just logical links, but also relevance links. Indeed, the inter-
play between both kinds of links matters. Theorem 1 above is a possibility result:
it gives suﬃcient conditions for the existence of well-behaved (priority) rules. I now
turn to impossibility results, which give suﬃcient conditions for the inexistence of any
non-degenerate rules F : J n → J satisfying both axioms.
First, what is a ‘degenerate’ aggregation rule? I shall draw on various familiar
versions of dictatorship. In preference aggregation theory, (i) a ‘strong dictator’ can
impose his entire preference relation, (ii) a ‘(weak) dictator’ can impose his strict
preferences (not his weak preferences which can be indiﬀerences), and (iii) a ‘veto-
dictator’ can prevent (‘veto’) any strict preference. All of this can be rephrased in
relevance-based terminology, drawing on the fact that strict preferences are expressed
by unambiguous propositions in the preference agenda (see Example 1). Indeed, for
the preference agenda: (i) a strong dictator can impose his entire judgment set, (ii)
a (weak) dictator can impose any unambiguous proposition, and (iii) a vetodictator
can prevent any unambiguous proposition. I now generalize these three classical no-
tions (and two other ones, namely semi-dictatorship and semi-vetodictatorship) to
arbitrary judgment aggregation problems (agendas):
Deﬁnition 7 Under an aggregation rule F : J n → J , an individual i is
• a strong dictator if F (J1, ..., Jn) = Ji for all (J1, ..., Jn) ∈ J n;
• a dictator (respectively, semi-dictator) if, for every unambiguous proposition
p ∈ UR, we have p ∈ F (J1, ..., Jn) for all (J1, ..., Jn) ∈ J
n such that p ∈ Ji
(respectively, such that p ∈ Ji and p ∈ Jj, j = i);
• a vetodictator (respectively, semi-vetodictator) if, for every unambiguous
proposition p ∈ UR, i has a veto (respectively, semi-veto) on p, i.e., a judgment
set Ji ∈ J not containing p such that p ∈ F (J1, ..., Jn) for all Jj ∈ J , j = i
(respectively, for all Jj ∈ J , j = i, containing p).
F is called strongly dictatorial (respectively (semi-)dictatorial, (semi-)vetodictatorial)
if some individual is a strong dictator (respectively (semi-)dictator, (semi-)vetodictator).
Remark 3: Under classical relevance, dictatorship and strong dictatorship are equiv-
alent (as UR = X).
Note that the diﬀerence between (veto)dictatorship and semi -(veto)dictatorship
only arises if F is not proposition-wise monotonic, i.e., if additional support for a
proposition can reverse a collective acceptance of that proposition.
Standard impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation are usually driven by
conditional entailments between propositions (ﬁrst used by Nehring and Puppe 2002).
A conditional entailment is an entailment that is conditional on some other proposi-
tions (with a non-triviality condition on the choice of these other propositions):
Deﬁnition 8 Proposition p ∈ X conditionally entails q ∈ X if {p} ∪ Y ⊢ q
for some (possibly empty) set Y ⊆ X that is consistent with p and with ¬q. The
conditional entailment is proper if p ⊢ q, i.e., p is consistent with ¬q.
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We need a variant of conditional entailment, to capture relevance links in addition
to logical links:
Deﬁnition 9 Proposition p ∈ X constrained entails q ∈ X (written ‘p ⊢∗ q’) if
{p} ∪ Y ⊢ q for some (possibly empty) set Y ⊆ UR that is consistent with every
explanation of p and with every explanation of ¬q. In this case, p constrained
entails q in virtue of Y (written ‘p ⊢Y q’).
Remark 4: Under classical relevance, constrained entailment is equivalent to condi-
tional entailment (as each proposition p has the only explanation {p}).
Examples are due. First, every unconditional entailment is a constrained en-
tailment: just take Y = ∅. Next, the general preference agenda X of Example 1
(with Arrovian relevance) contains many constrained entailments (and this is indeed
a source of impossibility). For instance, for pairwise distinct options x, y, z, we have
xRy ⊢{yPz} xPz, because {xRy, yPz} ⊢ xPz, where yPz belongs to UR and is consis-
tent with each explanation of xRy ({xRy, yRx} and {xRy,¬yRx}) and with the only
explanation of ¬xPz = zRx ({zRx}). By contrast, no constrained entailments (be-
sides the trivial self-entailments) exist in our example agenda X = {±a,±b,±(a∧b)}
with relevance given by (2). For instance, it is neither the case that a ⊢{¬(a∧b)} ¬b
(as ¬(a ∧ b) ∈ UR), nor the case that a ⊢{b} a ∧ b (as {b} is inconsistent with the
explanation {a,¬b} of ¬(a ∧ b)). As a result, our impossibility results will not apply
to this agenda — and indeed this agenda allows for plenty of well-behaved (premise-
based) aggregation rules. In general, the more relevance connections there are, the
fewer constrained entailments there are.15
Recall that a conditional entailment from p to q is ‘proper’ if p is consistent
with ¬q (‘no unconditional entailment’). For a constrained entailment to be ‘proper’,
something subtly stronger than consistency of p with ¬q is required:
Deﬁnition 10 A proposition p ∈ X properly constrained entails another q ∈ X
if p ⊢∗ q and every explanation of p is consistent with every explanation of ¬q.
Remark 5: Under classical relevance, proper constrained entailment is equivalent to
proper conditional entailment (as each p ∈ X has the only explanation {p}).
For the strict or general preference agenda (Example 1), all constrained entail-
ments without unconditional entailment are proper; for instance, the constrained
entailment xRy ⊢∗ xPz is proper because each explanation of xRy ({xRy, yRx} and
{xRy,¬yRx}) is consistent with each explanation of ¬xPz (= zRx). There are many
other examples.16
Our impossibility results draw on paths of constrained entailments.
15Formally, if R,R′ are relevance relations on X with corresponding constrained entailment rela-
tions ⊢∗,⊢
′
∗ (⊆ 2
X × X), then R ⊆ R′ ⇒ ⊢′∗ ⊆ ⊢∗ . Indeed, if R is reﬁned, then UR shrinks and
explanations increase in size and number, so that the requirements on Y get stronger.
16Every (non-unconditional) constrained entailment between root propositions is proper (see Ex-
ample 4), again because a root proposition p has only explanation {p}. If relevance is an equivalence
relation (as in Examples 1-3) which moreover partitions X into pairwise logically independent sub-
agendas (‘topics’), then all constrained entailments across equivalence classes are proper. (Two
subagendas X1,X2 are logically independent if the union of consistent subsets A ⊆ X1, B ⊆ X2 is
consistent.)
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Deﬁnition 11 (a) For propositions p, q ∈ X, if X contains propositions p1, ..., pm
(m ≥ 2) with p = p1 ⊢∗ p2 ⊢∗ ... ⊢∗ pm = q, I write p ⊢⊢ q; if moreover one of
these constrained entailments is proper, I write p ⊢⊢proper q.
(b) A set Z ⊆ X is pathlinked if p ⊢⊢ q for all p, q ∈ Z, and properly pathlinked
(in X) if moreover p ⊢⊢proper q for some (hence all) p, q ∈ Z.
Pathlinkedness of a set Z leads to a limited form of neutral aggregation within Z:
the same coalitions are ‘semi-decisive’ (in a technical sense) for each proposition in Z.
Such a neutrality argument is the ﬁrst step to establish our impossibility theorems; the
next step consists in proving that only singleton coalitions {i} can be ‘semi-decisive’.
Theorem 2 If the set UR of unambiguous propositions is properly pathlinked and
inconsistent, every aggregation rule F : J n → J satisfying IIP and UAP is semi-
vetodictatorial.
Theorem 3 If the set {p,¬p : p ∈ UR} of unambiguous or negated unambiguous
propositions is properly pathlinked, every aggregation rule F : J n → J satisfying IIP
and UAP is semi-dictatorial.
In both theorems, there may exist several semi-(veto)dictators, and there need not
exist any (veto)dictator. Like in all our theorems, the assumptions are not generally
tight, but become tight for classical relevance. All this will become clear in Section
8, where I apply the theorems to classical relevance.
To be able to strengthen ‘semi-dictatorial’ to ‘dictatorial’ in Theorem 3, it suﬃces
to add a small extra condition on the paths in Theorem 3. I call a constrained entail-
ment p ⊢∗ q ‘irreversible’ if it is not a ‘constrained equivalence’, i.e., if p constrained
entails q in virtue of a set Y without it being the case that q entails p given Y :
Deﬁnition 12 For p, q ∈ X, p irreversibly constrained entails q if p ⊢Y q for a
set Y for which {q} ∪ Y ⊢ p.
In the strict or general preference agenda (Example 1), all constrained entailments
between distinct propositions are irreversible. For instance, xRy irreversibly entails
xRz (where x, y, z are distinct options), as xRy ⊢{yPz} xRz where {xRz, yPz} ⊢ xRy.
By the next result, the semi-dictatorship of Theorem 3 becomes a dictatorship if at
least one constrained entailment is irreversible.
Deﬁnition 13 (a) For propositions p, q ∈ X, I write p ⊢⊢irrev q if X contains
propositions p1, ..., pm (m ≥ 2) with p = p1 ⊢∗ p2 ⊢∗ ... ⊢∗ pm = q, where at
least one of these constrained entailments is irreversible.
(b) A pathlinked set Z ⊆ X is irreversibly pathlinked if p ⊢⊢irrev q for some
(hence all) p, q ∈ Z.
Theorem 4 If the set {p,¬p : p ∈ UR} of unambiguous or negated unambiguous
propositions is properly and irreversibly pathlinked, every aggregation rule F : J n →
J satisfying IIP and UAP is dictatorial.
This theorem generalizes Arrow’s Theorem in its general and indiﬀerence-free
versions. To see why, note the following fact (shown in the appendix):
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Remark 6: The strict or general preference agenda for a set of at least three alter-
natives (with Arrovian relevance) satisﬁes the assumptions of Theorem 4, i.e., the set
{p,¬p : p ∈ UR} (which equals X) is properly and irreversibly pathlinked.
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By this observation, Theorem 4 has Arrow’s Theorem as a special case:
Corollary 1 (Arrow’s Theorem in both versions) Given the strict or general prefer-
ence agenda for a set of at least three alternatives (with Arrovian relevance), every
aggregation rule F : J n → J satisfying IIP (equivalent to Arrow’s independence of
irrelevant alternatives) and UAP (equivalent to the weak Pareto principle) is dictato-
rial.
I now apply our impossibility theorems to the classical relevance relation (Section
7) and then to a concrete example of evaluation aggregation (Section 8).18
7 The Arrow-type theorem in judgment aggregation as
a special case
I now state the spacial cases of Theorems 2-4 for classical relevance.19 Here these
theorems become tight, i.e., minimal in their assumptions (as long as the agenda is
ﬁnite).
Theorem 4 becomes the Arrow-type impossibility theorem on judgment aggrega-
tion (Dietrich and List 2007b, Dokow and Holzman 2010a, both building on Nehring
and Puppe 2002 and strengthening Wilson 1975). Indeed, the assumptions and ax-
ioms of Theorem 4 reduce to those of the Arrow-type theorem. The Arrow-type
theorem assumes, ﬁrstly, that the agenda is pathconnected. Pathconnectedness is de-
ﬁned like pathlinkedness, except that one uses conditional rather than constrained
entailment (it is introduced by Nehring and Puppe 2002 under the label ‘total blocked-
ness’). The Arrow-type theorem assumes, secondly, that the agenda is pair-negatable.
Recall that a set Y ⊆ X is minimal inconsistent if it is inconsistent and its proper
subsets are consistent. Pair-negatability means that X has a minimal inconsistent
subset Y which can be made consistent by negating some pair of propositions, i.e.,
(Y \{p, q}) ∪ {¬p,¬q} is consistent for some pair of distinct propositions p, q ∈ Y .
For instance, the strict and general preference agendas are pair-negatable once there
are three distinct alternatives x, y, z, as the subset Y = {xPy, yPz, zPx} is mini-
mal inconsistent and becomes consistent if we (for instance) replace xPy and yPz
17 In the case of the strict preference agenda, the pathlinkedness of X follows directly from the
well-known pathconnectedness of X (Nehring 2003, Dietrich and List 2007b, Dokow and Holzman
2010a).
18For brevity, I do not also apply the results to the case where relevance represents prior-
ity/premisehood (Example 4). In this case the sets UR and {±p : p ∈ UR} contain all root propositions
of the priority graph (and perhaps other propositions), so that our theorems assume certain paths
between root propositions (and perhaps other propositions). Whether these assumptions hold — i.e.,
whether such paths can be constructed — depends very much on the speciﬁc case, i.e., on the interplay
between the priority graph and logical connections.
19 I thank an anonymous referee for asking me to establish this important link.
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by yPx and zPy.20 To be precise, Theorem 4’s assumption (of proper irreversible
pathlinkedness) reduces to pathconnectedness and a slightly generalized version of
pair-negatability. In this generalized version, pair-negatability means that X has an
inconsistent subset Y such that the sets (Y \{p, q}) ∪ {¬p,¬q}, (Y \{p}) ∪ {¬p} and
(Y \{q}) ∪ {¬q} are each consistent for some pair of distinct propositions p, q ∈ Y .
This version implies the standard one since it does not require Y to be minimal
inconsistent and since (Y \{p}) ∪ {¬p} and (Y \{q}) ∪ {¬q}} are automatically con-
sistent if Y is minimal inconsistent. For ﬁnite X, both versions are equivalent since
a ﬁnite inconsistent set has a minimal inconsistent subset. I henceforth understand
‘pair-negatability’ in the generalized sense.
The following observation (proved in the appendix) shows that Theorem 4’s as-
sumptions indeed reduce to pathconnectedness and pair-negatability. The observation
in fact boils down to well-known facts, given the equivalence (for classical relevance)
of constrained and conditional entailment (see the citations in the proof).
Remark 7: For classical relevance, the agenda X (= UR = {p,¬p : p ∈ UR}) is
• pathlinked if and only if it is pathconnected,
• irreversibly pathlinked if and only if it is pathconnected and pair-negatable;
moreover pathlinkedness of X is equivalent to proper pathlinkedness of X.
So, Theorem 4 reduces to the Arrow-type theorem in the case of classical relevance:
Corollary 2 (the Arrow-type theorem in judgment aggregation) If the agenda is
pathconnected and pair-negatable, every aggregation rule F : J n → J satisfying
proposition-wise independence and the unanimity principle is dictatorial.21
If X is ﬁnite, this result is tight, as it has been proved with an ‘if and only if ’ by
Dokow and Holzman (2010a).
Now we turn to Theorems 2 and 3. Under classical relevance (for which X =
UR = {p,¬p : p ∈ UR}), these two results collapse into a single result, stated in the
next corollary. The reason is that each theorem’s assumption becomes equivalent to
pathconnectedness of X (by Remark 7), and (semi-)dictatorship becomes equivalent
to (semi-)vetodictatorship given proposition-wise independence.
Corollary 3 If the agenda is pathconnected, every aggregation rule F : J n → J sat-
isfying proposition-wise independence and the unanimity principle is semi-dictatorial.22
If X is ﬁnite, this result is also derivable by combining two known results, namely
20Pair-negatability can be deﬁned equivalently in terms of negating an even number (rather than a
pair ) of propositions. Another equivalent statement is Dokow and Holzman’s (2010a) ‘non-aﬃneness’
condition.
21Here and in Corollary 4, ‘dictatorial’ can be read in the weak or strong sense, as both are
equivalent for classical relevance (see Remark 3).
22 ‘Semi-dictatorial’ can again be read in the weak or strong sense, as both are equivalent for the
classic relevance relation. The strong sense is deﬁned like the weak sense, except that p ranges over
the entire agenda X, not UR. Given proposition-wise independence, strong semi-dictatorship by
individual i means that p ∈ F (J1, ..., Jn) whenever p ∈ Ji but p ∈ Jj for j = i.
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the Arrow-type theorem (Corollary 2) and a theorem by Dokow and Holzman (2010a).23
Again, the result is tight, i.e., would hold with an ‘if and only if ’, for ﬁnite X. In
Corollary 3, ‘semi-dictatorial’ cannot be strengthened to ‘dictatorial’ and there can
be multiple semi-dictators (as is clear from footnote 23).
Finally, we can also deduce a seminal theorem by Nehring and Puppe (2010), as
an anonymous referee kindly remarked. A rule F : J n → J is monotonic if addi-
tional support for the collectively endorsed judgment set never reverses its collective
endorsement (i.e., for all J1, ..., Jn, J ∈ J and individuals i, F (J1, ..., Jn) = J ⇒
F (J1, ..., Ji−1, J, Ji+1, ..., Jn) = J). Since semi-dictatorship implies dictatorship once
we assume monotonicity, Corollary 3 implies the following result:
Corollary 4 If the agenda is pathconnected, every aggregation rule F : J n → J
satisfying proposition-wise independence, monotonicity and the unanimity principle
is dictatorial.
Here again, the assumptions are tight (Nehring and Puppe 2010).
While Corollary 1 (Arrow’s Theorem), Corollary 2 (the Arrow-type theorem in
judgment aggregation) and Corollary 3 are special cases of our results — for particular
agendas and/or relevance relations — Corollary 4 is not a special case, but ‘only’ a con-
sequence of our results. Thus Nehring and Puppe’s theorem has not been generalized,
but re-derived.
8 A concrete application to evaluation aggregation
I now reconsider the evaluation agenda of Example 2 and work out a concrete appli-
cation in which Theorem 2’s semi-vetodictatorship or even Theorem 4’s dictatorship
applies. Suppose a country’s inﬂation rate y (in R) depends on two economic quan-
tities a and b (in R). I consider two cases.
Case 1: exogenously given theory of inﬂation. Assume that it is uncontro-
versially known that inﬂation obeys the equation ‘y = f(a, b)’ for a given function
f : R2 → R, where the equation is uniquely solvable in a (for any ﬁxed b and y) and
in b (for any ﬁxed a and y). The group needs to estimate a, b and y (matters 1, 2 and
3, respectively), subject to the equation. Formally, the set of matters is K = {1, 2, 3},
and the set of possible positions on a matter (‘estimates’) is V = R. An evaluation
is a function E : K → R, or equivalently a triple of estimates (a, b, y) ∈ R3. It is
coherent if and only if y = f(a, b). So the agenda is X = {±vk : k ∈ K,v ∈ R},
where vk is the proposition ‘v is the value of variable k’. To an evaluation E corre-
sponds the judgment set J ⊆ X containing those vk with E(k) = v and those ¬vk
with E(k) = v. Rational judgment sets are judgment sets corresponding to coherent
evaluations. A proposition is relevant to another if and only if it pertains to the
23To see why, let X be pathconnected. If X is also pair-negatable, it is dictatorial by Corollary
2, hence in particular semi-dictatorial. If X is not also pair-negatable (and X is ﬁnite), F must
be a ‘parity rule’ (see Dokow and Holzman’s 2010a Proposition 4.3), hence in particular a semi-
dictatorship. Under a parity rule, the collective endorses those propositions which are endorsed by
an odd number of individuals from M , where M ⊆ N is a ﬁxed subgroup of odd size. If X is not
pair-negatable, parity rules turn out to map into J .
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same variable (matter). Formally, R(±vk) = {±v
′
k : v
′ ∈ R}. The unambiguous
propositions are
UR = {vk : k ∈ K,v ∈ R} = {v1, v2, v3 : v ∈ R}.
Theorem 2 applies, so that only vetodictatorships obey our conditions on aggregation.
To show this, I prove that UR is properly pathlinked and inconsistent. Inconsistency
is obvious, since a variable cannot have many values. Proper pathlinkedness follows
from two observations:
(a) Between any pair vk, v
′
k′ ∈ UR with k = k
′ there is a proper constrained entail-
ment vk ⊢∗ v
′
k′ , i.e., a ‘one-step path’. For instance, for any a, y ∈ R, a1 ⊢Y y3
with Y = {b2}, where b is chosen such that y = f(a, b). To see that this is
a well-deﬁned constrained entailment, note that Y is consistent with the only
explanation of a1, i.e., {a1}∪ {¬a1 : a
′ = a}, and with each explanation of ¬y3,
i.e., each {y¯3} ∪ {¬y3 : y
′ = y¯} for y¯ = y. The constrained entailment is proper
because the explanation of a1 is consistent with each explanation of ¬y3.
(b) Between any pair vk, v
′
k ∈ UR involving the same variable k there is a ‘two-step
path’: choosing any wk′ ∈ UR with k
′ = k, we have vk ⊢∗ wk′ ⊢∗ v
′
k by (a).
Case 2: controversial theory of inﬂation. Now assume there are two rival
theories: one claims the equation ‘y = f(a, b)’, the other claims the equation ‘y =
g(a, b)’, where f, g : R2 → R are distinct functions and each equation is again uniquely
solvable in a (for any ﬁxed b, y) and in b (for any ﬁxed a, y). Consider a reﬁned decision
problem in which the group needs not only to estimate a, b and y (matters 1, 2 and
3), but also to choose one of the two theories (matter 4). This leads to another
application of Example 2, yet in the generalized version of footnote 7 in which the set
of possible positions on a matter is matter-dependent (‘Vk’ instead of ‘V ’). Formally,
the set of matters (issues) is now K = {1, 2, 3, 4}, and the set of possible positions on
a matter k is Vk = R if k ∈ {1, 2.3} and Vk = {f, g} if k = 4. An evaluation E assigns
a position in Vk to each matter k; equivalently, it is a tuple (a, b, y, h) ∈ R
3 × {f, g}
containing the three estimates and the chosen theory (function). it is coherent if and
only if the estimates respect the chosen theory, i.e., y = h(a, b). The agenda is thus
X = {±vk : k ∈ K, v ∈ Vk}, where proposition vk means that v is the value on matter
k. As usual, to an evaluation E corresponds the judgment set J ⊆ X containing
those vk with E(k) = v and those ¬vk with E(k) = v; rational judgment sets are
judgment sets corresponding to coherent evaluations. The relevance relation is given
by R(±vk) = {±v
′
k : v
′ ∈ Vk}. The unambiguous propositions are
UR = {vk : k ∈ K, v ∈ Vk} = {v1, v2, v3 : v ∈ R} ∪ {f4, g4}.
This time Theorem 4 applies, so that dictatorships are the only aggregation rules
satisfying our conditions. I now show this. Note that the closure under negation of
UR is the entire agenda X. So I need to show that X is properly and irreversibly
pathlinked. First, the set U∗ := {vk : k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, v ∈ R} is properly pathlinked;
the argument resembles that in Case 1, as U∗ corresponds to the set of unambiguous
propositions in Case 1.24 I now establish pathlinkedness of X by proving that, for all
24To adapt the argument, simply add proposition f4 to each set Y used in a constrained entailment.
This enforces the equation ‘y = f(a, b)’ which used to be exogenous in Case 1.
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p ∈ X,
p ⊢⊢∗ h4 and h4 ⊢⊢∗ p for each h ∈ {f, g}. (10)
I distinguish between diﬀerent cases (in cases (a) and (b) the constructed paths have
only one step, so that ‘⊢⊢∗’ can be replaced by ‘⊢∗’):
(a) Case p ∈ U∗: As U∗ is pathlinked, it suﬃces to show (10) for some p ∈ U∗.
Firstly, for any a1 ∈ U∗ and h ∈ {f, g} we have h4 ⊢∗ a1 in virtue of Y =
{b2, y3} with any b ∈ R and y := h(a, b) (because a is the only solution of the
equation y = h(a, b)). Secondly, as long as a and b have been chosen such that
f(a, b) = g(a, b), we also have a1 ⊢Y h4.
(b) Case ¬p ∈ U∗, i.e., p = ¬vk with vk ∈ U
∗: Consider h = f (the proof is
analogous for h = g). By (a), vk ⊢∗ g4 and g4 ⊢∗ vk. So ¬g4 ⊢∗ ¬vk and
¬vk ⊢∗ ¬g4 using contraposition (see Lemma 1). In other words, f4 ⊢∗ ¬vk and
¬vk ⊢∗ f4 (as desired), because the constrained entailment relation does not
distinguish between f4 and ¬g4 (they are logically equivalent).
(c) Case p,¬p ∈ U∗, i.e., p ∈ {±f4,±g4}: Consider any h ∈ {f, g}. I may assume
without loss of generality that p ∈ {f4, g4}, as ¬f4 is interchangeable with g4,
and ¬g4 with f4 (see (b)). Pick any q ∈ U
∗. By (a) p ⊢⊢∗ q and q ⊢⊢∗ h4, so
that p ⊢⊢∗ h4; similarly, h4 ⊢⊢∗ q and q ⊢⊢∗ p, so that h4 ⊢⊢∗ p.
Finally, the pathlinkedness of X is proper and irreversible. It is proper since con-
strained entailments vk ⊢∗ v
′
k′ with k = k
′ are proper. It is irreversible because, for all
a, b ∈ R and all y = f(a, b), there is an irreversible constrained entailment a1 ⊢∗ ¬y3
(take Y = {b2, f4}).
9 An impossibility theorem with strong dictatorship
When do our conditions on aggregation even imply strong dictatorship? For the gen-
eral preference agenda, this cannot be the case: it is indeed well-known that Arrow’s
axioms allow for non-strong dictatorships (in the form of ‘lexicographic dictatorships’,
in which a ‘second-order dictator’ acts as tie-breaker wherever the ‘ﬁrst-order dictator’
is indiﬀerent).
A ﬁrst observation is that if all propositions are unambiguous, i.e., if UR = X, as
is for instance true for classical relevance, then a dictatorship is automatically strong,
so that Theorem 4 becomes a strong dictatorship result:
Corollary 5 If X is properly and irreversibly pathlinked and UR = X, every aggre-
gation rule F : J n → J satisfying IIP and UAP is strongly dictatorial.
In fact, the condition UR = X can be weakened considerably. A proposition
p ∈ X is logically equivalent to a set J ⊆ X if J entails p and p entails all q ∈ J . For
instance, a ∧ b is equivalent to {a, b} (where a, b, a ∧ b ∈ X).
Theorem 5 If {p,¬p : p ∈ UR} is properly and irreversibly pathlinked and each
proposition in X is logically equivalent to a set of negated unambiguous propositions
J ⊆ {¬p : p ∈ UR}, then every aggregation rule F : J
n → J satisfying IIP and UAP
is strongly dictatorial.
I give two examples where the additional condition holds, and one where it fails:
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• The condition holds trivially if UR = X, hence in particular if relevance is
classical. So, for classical relevance Theorem 5 reduces, just like Theorem 4, to
the Arrow-type theorem in judgment aggregation stated in Corollary 2.
• The condition also holds for the evaluation agenda of Example 4 (and thus for
the applications discussed in Section 8). Here, {¬p : p ∈ UR} contains the
propositions of type ¬vk. Each proposition q ∈ X is indeed logically equivalent
to a set J of such propositions: if q takes the form vk, choose J = {¬v
′
k : v
′ =
v}; if q takes the form ¬vk, choose J = {¬vk}. Note that in the application
discussed under Case 2 of Section 8 all premises of Theorem 5 hold, so that
strong dictatorships are the only ‘solutions’.
• The condition fails for the general preference agenda: no unambiguous propo-
sition (of the form xPy = ¬yRx) is logically equivalent to any set of negated
unambiguous propositions (of the form ¬x′Py′ = y′Rx′). This is why Arrow’s
theorem in its general version is not a strong dictatorship result.
10 Conclusion
The relevance-based approach to judgment aggregation hopefully opens up new per-
spectives, by overcoming proposition-wise independence without allowing for arbi-
trariness. On the constructive side, I have generalized sequential-priority and premise-
based aggregation towards an arbitrary priority structure, captured by a ‘priority
graph’ over the propositions. On the axiomatic side, I have introduced more gen-
eral, relevance-based axioms of independence and unanimity-preservation, and shown
various impossibility theorems based on these axioms. In the special case of the
classical relevance notion, the two axioms reduce to their classical counterparts, and
the theorems reduce to familiar results such as the Arrow-type theorem in judgment
aggregation.
This paper is a ﬁrst step. Future research could focus on other relevance-based
aggregation rules, axioms and theorems. It could also address a more normative ques-
tion: how should the relevance relation be designed in the ﬁrst place? For instance,
when should relevance be transitive? Reﬂexive? Acyclic? Should relevance connec-
tions and logical connections be related in any systematic way? Under the priority
interpretation of relevance, which propositions should have priority? Such questions
are obviously diﬃcult. Yet the relevance-based approach needs systematic criteria for
designing the relevance relation.
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A Proofs
I now prove all results. Throughout, N is the set of individuals {1, ..., n}.
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A.1 Theorem 1 on priority rules
To prove this theorem, let F ≡ F(Dp)p∈X0 be a priority rule relative to a priority graph
R on a ﬁnite agenda X. The set of R-maximal (resp. R-minimal) elements of a set
S ⊆ X is denoted maxR(S) (resp. minR(S)) and contains those s ∈ S for which
there is no r ∈ S\{s} such that sRr (resp. rRs). As R is acyclic on X0 and as X0
is ﬁnite,
max
R
S = ∅ and min
R
S = ∅ for all ∅ = S ⊆ X0. (11)
(a) LetR be transitive. Suppose for a contradiction that IIP is violated. Then not
all p ∈ X0 have the property that, for all (J1, ..., Jn), (J
′
1, ..., J
′
n) ∈ J
n, if Ji ∩R(p) =
J ′i ∩R(p) for all i then
F (J1, ..., Jn) ∩ {±p} = F (J
′
1, ..., J
′
n) ∩ {±p}. (12)
Let p ∈ X0 be R-minimal such that this property fails. Pick (J1, ..., Jn), (J
′
1, ..., J
′
n) ∈
J n such that Ji ∩ R(p) = J
′
i ∩ R(p) for all i and (12) is violated. Choose any
q ∈ R(p)\{±p}. By R’s transitivity R(q) ⊆ R(p), and so Ji ∩R(q) = J
′
i ∩R(q) for
all i. By p’s minimality property, (12) holds for q instead of p. As this is so for all
q ∈ R(p)\{±p},
F (J1, ..., Jn) ∩R(p)\{±p} = F (J
′
1, ..., J
′
n) ∩R(p)\{±p}. (13)
Now let Y := {p˜ ∈ {±p} : the set (13) entails p˜}.
Case 1 : Y = ∅. Then, by deﬁnition of the priority rule, we have F (J1, ..., Jn) ∩
{±p} = Y and F (J ′1, ..., J
′
n) ∩ {±p} = Y . This implies (12), contradicting the choice
of p.
Case 2 : Y = ∅. Then, again by deﬁnition of the priority rule, F (J1, ..., Jn) ∩
{±p} = Dp(J1∩{±p}, ..., Jn∩{±p}) and F (J
′
1, ..., J
′
n)∩{±p} = Dp(J
′
1∩{±p}, ..., J
′
n∩
{±p}). These two sets are distinct as (12) is violated. So there is an i such that
Ji ∩ {±p} = J
′
i ∩ {±p}. So, as Ji ∩ R(p) = J
′
i ∩ R(p), R(p) cannot contain both
of ±p, hence contains none of ±p by negation-invariance. In other words, R(p) =
R(p)\{±p}. So the set (13) equals F (J1, ..., Jn) ∩ R(p), which contains a member
of each pair ±r ∈ R(p) and thus entails p or ¬p by non-underdetermination. This
contradicts that Y = ∅.
(b) Assume the transitivity and quasi-independence conditions. For all p ∈ X, put
Rp := R(p)∪ {±p} and Rp := R(p)\{±p}. Let (J1, ..., Jn) ∈ J
n. The consistency of
J := F (J1, ..., Jn) follows from three claims:
Claim 1 : X = ∪p∈maxRX0R
p; hence, J = ∪p∈maxRX0(J ∩R
p).
Claim 2 : for any pairwise irrelevant propositions (pi)i∈I , the sets (R
pi)i∈I are logi-
cally quasi-independent; hence, the sets (Rp)p∈maxRX0 are logically quasi-independent.
Claim 3 : J ∩Rp is consistent for each p ∈ X0, hence also for each p ∈ maxRX0.
Proof of Claim 1. For a contradiction, suppose X\ ∪p∈maxRX0 R
p = ∅. Then,
by negation-invariance, X0\ ∪p∈maxRX0 R
p = ∅. Hence by (11) there is a q ∈
maxR (X0\ ∪p∈maxRX0 R
p). As q /∈ ∪p∈maxRX0R
p, we have q /∈ maxRX0. So q
is relevant to some q′ ∈ X0\{q}. As q is maximal in X0\ ∪p∈maxRX0 R
p and relevant
to q′, it does not belong to X0\∪p∈maxRX0R
p. So q′ ∈ ∪p∈maxRX0R
p. Hence, as R is
transitive, q is relevant to some p ∈ maxRX0, a contradiction as q /∈ ∪p∈maxRX0R
p.
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Proof of Claim 2. Consider pairwise irrelevant propositions (pi)i∈I and consistent
sets Bi ⊆ Rpi (i ∈ I) whose union contains no pair ±p. I show that ∪i∈IBi is
consistent. Without loss of generality let each Bi contain a member of each pair
±p ∈ Rpi (otherwise extend the Bi’s to consistent sets B¯i ⊆ R
pi with this property;
the present proof shows the consistency of ∪i∈IB¯i, hence that of ∪i∈IBi). As the sets
R(pi) (i ∈ I) are logically quasi-independent, (*) ∪i∈I(Bi ∩R(pi)) is consistent. By
non-underdetermination, (**) each Bi ∩ R(pi) entails a p˜i ∈ {±pi}. Since each Bi
entails p˜i (∈ {±p}) and by deﬁnition equals (Bi∩R(pi))∪{pi} or (Bi∩R(p˜i))∪{¬pi},
it must by consistency equal (Bi ∩ R(pi)) ∪ {p˜i}. So, taking the union, ∪i∈IBi =
∪i∈I((Bi ∩R(pi)) ∪ {p˜i}). This set is consistent by (*) and (**).
Proof of Claim 3. Suppose the contrary: there is a p ∈ X0 for which J ∩ Rp is
inconsistent. By (11), we can pick a p ∈ X0 that is R-maximal subject to J ∩ R
p
being inconsistent. By an argument similar to that made for Claim 1,
Rp = ∪q∈maxR(X0∩Rp)R
q; hence J ∩Rp = ∪q∈maxR(X0∩Rp)(J ∩R
q). (14)
By Claim 2, the sets Rq, q ∈ maxR(X0∩Rp), are logically quasi-independent. Hence,
as each J ∩ Rq in (14) is consistent (by the maximality of p), the set J ∩ Rp is
consistent. In other words, J ∩ R(p)\{±p} is consistent. So, by the deﬁnition of
priority rules (see (7)), the union (J ∩Rp)∪ (J ∩{±p}) is still consistent. This union
equals J ∩Rp. The consistency of J ∩Rp contradicts the choice of p. 
A.2 Constrained entailment and (semi-)decisive coalitions: prepara-
tory lemmas
Before proving the impossibility theorems, I show some lemmas that help us under-
stand constrained entailment and its eﬀect on (semi-)winning coalitions.
First, as this deﬁnition of constrained entailment is symmetric in p and ¬q, con-
strained entailment satisﬁes contraposition, as the reader checks easily:
Lemma 1 (contraposition) For all p, q ∈ X and all Y ⊆ UR, p ⊢Y q ⇔ ¬q ⊢Y ¬p.
I now give a suﬃcient condition for when a constrained entailment reduces to an
unconditional entailment.
Lemma 2 For all p, q ∈ X with R(p) ⊆ R(¬q) or R(¬q) ⊆ R(p), p ⊢∗ q if and only
if p ⊢ q.
Proof. Let p, q be as speciﬁed. Obviously, p ⊢ q implies p ⊢∅ q. Suppose for a
contradiction that p ⊢∗ q, say p ⊢Y q, but p ⊢ q. Then {p,¬q} is consistent. So there
is an B ∈ J containing p and ¬q. Then
• the set B ∩ {r,¬r : rRp} is an explanation of p;
• the set B ∩ {r,¬r : rR¬q} is an explanation of ¬q.
One of these two sets is a superset of the other one, asR(p) ⊆ R(¬q) orR(¬q) ⊆ R(p);
call this superset J . As p ⊢Y q, Y ∪J is consistent. So, as J entails both p and ¬q, also
Y ∪J ∪{p,¬q} is consistent. In particular, Y ∪{p,¬q} is consistent, in contradiction
to the fact that p ⊢Y q. 
The following fact helps in choosing the set Y in a constrained entailment.
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Lemma 3 For all p, q ∈ X, if p ⊢∗ q, then p ⊢Y q for some set Y ⊆ UR\(R(p) ∪
R(¬q)).
Proof. Let p, q ∈ X, and assume p ⊢∗ q, say p ⊢Y q. The proof is done by showing
that p ⊢Y \(R(p)∪R(¬q)) q. Suppose for a contradiction that not p ⊢Y \(R(p)∪R(¬q)) q.
Then
(*) {p,¬q} ∪ Y \(R(p) ∪R(¬q)) is consistent.
I show that
(**) p ⊢ p′ for all p′ ∈ Y ∩R(p) and ¬q ⊢ q′ for all q′ ∈ Y ∩R(¬q),
which together with (*) implies that {p,¬q} ∪ Y is consistent, a contradiction
since p ⊢Y q. Suppose for a contradiction that p
′ ∈ Y ∩R(p) but p ⊢ p′. Then there
is a B ∈ J containing p and ¬p′. The set J := B ∩ {r,¬r : rRp} does not entail ¬p,
hence is an explanation of p (as R is a relevance relation). So J ∪ Y is consistent (as
p ⊢Y q), a contradiction since J ∪Y contains both p
′ and ¬p′. For analogous reasons,
for all q′ ∈ Y ∩Xl it cannot be that ¬q ⊢ q′. 
Now I introduce notions of decisive and semi-decisive coalitions, and I show that
semi-decisiveness is preserved along paths of constrained entailments.
Deﬁnition 14 A possibly empty coalition C ⊆ N is decisive (respectively, semi-
decisive) for p ∈ X if its members have judgment sets Ji ∈ J , i ∈ C, containing
p, such that p ∈ F (J1, ..., Jn) for all Ji ∈ J , i ∈ N\C (respectively, for all Ji ∈ J ,
i ∈ N\C, not containing p).
While a decisive coalition for p can always enforce p (by using appropriate judg-
ment sets), a semi-decisive coalition can enforce p provided all other individuals reject
p. Let W(p) and C(p) be the sets of decisive and semi-decisive coalitions for p ∈ X,
respectively. The next lemma shows that semi-decisiveness is ‘contagious’ along con-
strained entailments. The lemma parallels many other ‘contagion lemmas’ in social
choice theory.
Lemma 4 (contagion lemma) For all p, q ∈ X, if p ⊢∗ q then C(p) ⊆ C(q). In
particular, if Z ⊆ X is pathlinked, all p ∈ Z have the same semi-decisive coalitions.25
Proof. Suppose p, q ∈ X, and p ⊢∗ q, say p ⊢Y q, where by Lemma 3 without loss
of generality. Y ∩ R(p) = Y ∩ R(¬q) = ∅. Let C ∈ C(p). So there are sets Ji ∈ J ,
i ∈ C, containing p, such that p ∈ F (J1, ..., Jn) for all Ji ∈ J , i ∈ N\C, containing
¬p. By Y ’s consistency with every explanation of p, it is possible to change each Ji,
i ∈ C, into a set (still in J ) that contains every y ∈ Y and has the same intersection
with R(p) as Ji; this change preserves the required properties, i.e., it preserves that
p ∈ Ji for all i ∈ C (as R is a relevance relation), and preserves that p ∈ F (J1, ..., Jn)
for all Ji ∈ J , i ∈ N\C, containing ¬p (by Y ∩ R(p) = ∅ and IIP). So we may
assume without loss of generality. that Y ⊆ Ji for all i ∈ C. Hence, by {p} ∪ Y ⊢ q,
all Ji, i ∈ C, contain q.
To establish that C ∈ C(q), I consider any sets Ji ∈ J , i ∈ N\C, all containing
¬q, and I show that q ∈ F (J1, ..., Jn). We may assume without loss of generality.
25Constrained entailments preserve semi-decisiveness but usually not decisiveness.
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that Y ⊆ Ji for all i ∈ N\C, by an argument like the one above (using that Y is
consistent with any explanation of ¬q, R is a relevance relation, Y ∩ R(¬q) = ∅,
and IIP). As {¬q} ∪ Y ⊢ ¬p, all Ji, i ∈ N\C, contain ¬p. Hence p ∈ F (J1, ..., Jn).
Moreover, Y ⊆ F (J1, ..., Jn) by Y ⊆ UR. So, as {p} ∪ Y ⊢ q, q ∈ F (J1, ..., Jn), as
desired. 
For any set S of coalitions C ⊆ N , let S := {C ′ ⊆ N : C ⊆ C′ for some C ∈ S}.
Lemma 5 For all p, q ∈ X,
(a) p ⊢∗ q irreversibly if and only if ¬q ⊢∗ ¬p irreversibly;
(b) if p ⊢∗ q irreversibly then C(p) ⊆ C(q).
Proof. Let p, q ∈ X. Part (a) follows from Lemma 1 and the fact that, for all
Y ⊆ UR, {q} ∪ Y ⊢ p if and only if {¬p} ∪ Y ⊢ ¬q.
Regarding (b), suppose p ⊢∗ q irreversibly, say p ⊢Y q with {q} ∪ Y ⊢ p. We can
assume without loss of generality. that Y ∩R(p) = Y ∩R(¬q) = ∅, since otherwise
we could replace Y by Y ′ := Y \(R(p) ∪R(¬q)), for which still p ⊢Y ′ q (by the proof
of Lemma 3) and {q} ∪ Y ′ ⊢ p. To show C(p) ⊆ C(q), consider any C′ ∈ C(p). So
there is a C ∈ C(p) with C ⊆ C′. Hence there are Ji ∈ J , i ∈ C, containing p, such
that p ∈ F (J1, ..., Jn) for all Ji ∈ J , i ∈ N\C, containing ¬p. Like in earlier proofs,
I may suppose without loss of generality. that, for all i ∈ C, Y ⊆ Ji (using that Y is
consistent with all explanations of p, R is a relevance relation, IIP, and Y ∩R(p) = ∅);
hence, by {p} ∪ Y ⊢ q, q ∈ Ji for all i ∈ C. Further, as {¬p, q} ∪ Y is consistent (by
{q} ∪ Y ⊢ p), there are sets Ji ∈ J , i ∈ C ′\C, such that {¬p, q} ∪ Y ⊆ Ji for all
i ∈ C′\C.
I have to show that q ∈ F (J1, ..., Jn) for all Ji ∈ J , i ∈ N\C
′, containing ¬q.
Consider such sets Ji, i ∈ N\C
′. Again, we may assume without loss of generality.
that for all i ∈ N\C′, Y ⊆ Ji (as Y is consistent with all explanations of ¬q, R is a
relevance relation, IIP, and Y ∩ R(¬q) = ∅), which by {¬q} ∪ Y ⊢ ¬p implies that
¬p ∈ Ji for all i ∈ N\C
′. In summary then,
Ji ⊇


{p, q} ∪ Y for all i ∈ C
{¬p, q} ∪ Y for all i ∈ C′\C
{¬p,¬q} ∪ Y for all i ∈ N\C ′.
So p ∈ F (J1, ..., Jn) (by the choice of the sets Ji, i ∈ C) and Y ⊆ F (J1, ..., Jn) (by
Y ⊆ UR). Hence, as {p} ∪ Y ⊢ q, q ∈ F (J1, ..., Jn), as desired. 
In the following characterisation of decisive coalitions it is crucial that p ∈ UR.
Lemma 6 If p ∈ UR, W(p) = {C ⊆ N : all coalitions C
′ ⊇ C are in C(p)}.
Proof. Let p ∈ UR and C ⊆ N . If C ∈ W(p) then clearly all coalitions C
′ ⊇ C
are in C(p). Conversely, suppose all coalitions C′ ⊇ C are in C(p). As C ∈ C(p), there
are sets Ji, i ∈ C, containing p, such that p ∈ F (J1, ..., Jn) for all sets Ji, i ∈ N\C,
not containing p. To show that C ∈ W(p), consider any sets Ji, i ∈ N\C (containing
or not containing p); I show that p ∈ F (J1, ..., Jn). Let C
′ := C ∪{i ∈ N\C : p ∈ Ji}.
By C ⊆ C ′, C′ ∈ C(p). So there are sets Bi, i ∈ C
′, containing p, such that
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p ∈ F (B1, ..., Bn) for all sets Bi, i ∈ N\C
′, not containing p. As p has a single
explanation, we have for all i ∈ C′ Ji ∩ {r,¬r : r ∈ R(p)} = Bi ∩ {r,¬r : r ∈ R(p)},
hence Ji ∩R(p) = Bi ∩R(p). So, by IIP and the deﬁnition of the sets Bi, i ∈ C
′, and
since p ∈ Ji for all i ∈ N\C
′, p ∈ F (J1, ..., Jn), as desired. 
B Theorems 2 and 3 on (semi-)vetodictatorship
Proof of Theorem 2. Let UR be inconsistent and properly pathlinked. I ﬁrst prepare
the proof by establishing three simple claims.
Claim 1. (i) The set C(p) is the same for all p ∈ UR; call it C0. (ii) The set C(¬p)
is the same for all p ∈ UR.
Part (i) follows from Lemma 4. Part (ii) follows from it too because, by Lemma
1, {¬p : p ∈ UR} is like UR pathlinked, q.e.d.
Claim 2. ∅ ∈ C0 and N ∈ C0.
By UAP, N ∈ C0. Suppose for a contradiction that ∅ ∈ C0. Consider any
judgment set J ∈ J . Then F (J, ..., J) contains all p ∈ UR, by N ∈ C0 if p ∈ J , and
by ∅ ∈ C0 if p ∈ J . Hence F (J, ..., J) is inconsistent, a contradiction, q.e.d.
By Claim 2, there is a minimal coalition C in C0 (with respect to inclusion), and
C = ∅. By C = ∅, there is a j ∈ C. Write C−j := C\{j}. As UR is properly
pathlinked, there exist p ∈ UR and r, s ∈ X such that p ⊢⊢ r, r ⊢∗ s properly, and
s ⊢⊢ p.
Claim 3. C(r) = C(s) = C0; hence C ∈ C(r) and C−j ∈ C(s).
By Lemma 4, C(p) ⊆ C(r) ⊆ C(s) ⊆ C(p). So C(r) = C(s) = C(p) = C0, q.e.d.
Now let Y be such that r ⊢Y s, where by Lemma 3 without loss of generality.
Y ∩ R(r) = Y ∩ R(¬s) = ∅. By C ∈ C(r), there are judgment sets Ji ∈ J , i ∈ C,
containing r, such that r ∈ F (J1, ..., Jn) for all Ji ∈ J , i ∈ N\C, not containing r. I
assume without loss of generality. that
for all i ∈ C−j, Y ⊆ Ji, hence (by {r} ∪ Y ⊢ s) s ∈ Ji, (15)
which I may do by an argument like that in the proof of Lemma 4 (using that Y is
consistent with any explanation of q, R is a relevance relation, Y ∩ R(r) = ∅, and
IIP). By (15) and as C−j ∈ C(s) (see Claim 3), there are sets Bi ∈ J , i ∈ N\C−j,
containing ¬s, such that, writing Bi := Ji for all i ∈ C−j ,
¬s ∈ F (B1, ..., Bn). (16)
I may without loss of generality. modify the sets Bi, i ∈ N\C−j, into new sets in J as
long as their intersections with R(¬s) stays the same (because the new sets then still
contain ¬s as R is a relevance relation, and still satisfy (16) by IIP). First, I modify
the set Bi for i = j: as r ⊢∗ s properly, Bj ∩ {t,¬t : t ∈ R(¬s)} (an explanation of
¬s) is consistent with any explanation of r, hence with Jj ∩{t,¬t : t ∈ R(r)}, so that
I may assume that Jj ∩ {t,¬t : t ∈ R(r)} ⊆ Bj; which implies that
Bi ∩R(r) = Ji ∩R(r) for all i ∈ C. (17)
Second, I modify the sets Bi, i ∈ N\C: I assume (using that Y ∩R(¬s) = ∅ and Y ’s
consistency with any explanation of ¬s) that
for all i ∈ N\C, Y ⊆ Bi, hence (as {¬s} ∪ Y ⊢ ¬r) ¬r ∈ Bi. (18)
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The deﬁnition of the sets Ji, i ∈ C, and (18) imply, via (17) and IIP, that
r ∈ F (B1, ..., Bn). (19)
By (16), (19), and the inconsistency of {r,¬s} ∪ Y , the set Y is not a subset of
F (B1, ..., Bn). So there is a y ∈ Y with y ∈ F (B1, ..., Bn). We have {j} ∈ C(¬y} for
the following two reasons.
• Bj contains ¬y; otherwise y ∈ Bi for all i ∈ N , so that y ∈ F (B1, ..., Bn) by
y ∈ UR.
• Consider any sets Ci ∈ J , i = j, not containing ¬y, i.e., containing y. I show
that ¬y ∈ J := F (C1, ..., Cj−1, Bj , Cj+1, ..., Cn). For all i = j, Ci ∩ {t,¬t :
t ∈ R(y)} is consistent with y, hence is an explanation of y (as R satisﬁes
non-underdetermination); for analogous reasons, Bi ∩ {t,¬t : t ∈ R(y)} is an
explanation of y. These two explanations must be identical by y ∈ UR. So
Ci ∩R(y) = Bi∩R(y). Hence, by y ∈ F (B1, ..., Bn) and IIP, y ∈ J . So ¬y ∈ J ,
as desired.
By {j} ∈ C(¬y) and Claim 1, {j} ∈ C(¬q) for all q ∈ UR. So j is a semi-
vetodictator. 
Proof of Theorem 3. Let {±p : p ∈ UR} be properly pathlinked. I will reduce the
proof to that of Theorem 2. I start again with two simple claims.
Claim 1. The set C(q) is the same for all q ∈ {±p : p ∈ UR}; call it C0.
This follows immediately from Lemma 4, q.e.d.
Claim 2. ∅ ∈ C0 and N ∈ C0.
By UAP, N ∈ C(p) for all p ∈ UR; hence N ∈ C0. This implies, for all p ∈ UR,
that ∅ ∈ C(¬p); hence ∅ ∈ C0, q.e.d.
Now by an analogous argument to that in the proof of Theorem 2, but based this
time on the present Claims 1 and 2 rather than on the two ﬁrst claims in Theorem
2’s proof, one can show that there exists an individual j such that {j} ∈ C(¬q) for
all q ∈ UR. So, by the present Claim 1 (which is stronger than the ﬁrst claim in
Theorem 2’s proof),
{j} ∈ C(q) for all q ∈ UR. (20)
So j is a semi-dictator, for the following reason. Let q ∈ UR and let (J1, ..., Jn) ∈ J
n
be such that q ∈ Jj and q ∈ Ji, i = j. By (20) there is a set Bj ∈ J containing
q such that q ∈ F (B1, ..., Bn) for all Bi ∈ J , i = j, not containing q. Since q has
only one explanation (by q ∈ UR), the two explanations Jj ∩ {t,¬t : t ∈ R(q)} and
Bj ∩{t,¬t : t ∈ R(q)} are identical. So Jj ∩R(q) = Bj ∩R(q). Hence, using IIP and
the deﬁnition of Bj , q ∈ F (J1, ..., Jn), as desired. 
B.1 Theorems 4 and 5 on weak or strong dictatorship and related
results
Proof of Theorem 4. Let {±p : p ∈ UR} be properly and irreversibly pathlinked. By
Theorem 3, there is a semi-dictator i. I show that i is a dictator.
Claim. For all q ∈ {±p : p ∈ UR}, C(q) contains all coalitions containing i.
Consider any q ∈ {±q : q ∈ UR} and any coalition C ⊆ N containing i. By proper
pathlinkedness there exist p ∈ UR and r, s ∈ X such that p ⊢⊢ r ⊢∗ s ⊢⊢ q, where
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r ⊢∗ s is a properly constrained entailment. By {i} ∈ C(p) and Lemma 4, {i} ∈ C(r).
So, by Lemma 5(b), C ∈ C(s). Hence, by Lemma 4, C ∈ C(q), q.e.d.
By this claim and Lemma 6, {i} ∈ W(p) for all p ∈ UR. This implies that i is a
dictator, by an argument similar to the one that completed the proof of Theorem 3.

Proof of Remark 6. Let X be the general preference agenda with Arrovian R (the
proof for the strict preference agenda is left to the reader). Recall that UR = {xPy :
x, y ∈ A,x = y} where xPy := ¬yRx. I show that (i) UR is pathlinked, and (ii)
there are r, s ∈ UR with proper and irreversible constrained entailments r ⊢∗ ¬s ⊢∗ r.
Then, by (i) and Lemma 1, {¬p : p ∈ UR} is (like UR) pathlinked, which together
with (ii) implies that {±p : p ∈ UR} (= X) is properly and irreversibly pathlinked,
completing the proof.
Proof of (i): Consider any xPy, x′Py′ ∈ UR. I show that xPy ⊢⊢ x
′Py′. The
paths to be constructed depend on whether or not x ∈ {x′, y′} and whether or not
y ∈ {x′, y′}. I consider the following list of cases (which is exhaustive since x = y and
x′ = y′):
• Case x = x′, y′&y = x′, y′: Here xPy ⊢{x′Px,yPy′} x
′Py′.
• Case y = y′&x = x′, y′: Here xPy ⊢{x′Px} x
′Py = x′Py′.
• Case y = x′&x = x′, y′: Here xPy ⊢{yPy′} xPy
′ ⊢{x′Px} x
′Py′.
• Case x = x′&y = y′, x′: Here xPy ⊢{yPy′} xPy
′.
• Case x = y′&y = x′, y′: Here xPy ⊢{x′Px} x
′Py ⊢{yPx} x
′Px.
• Case x = x′&y = y′: Here xPy ⊢∅ xPy.
• Case x = y′&y = x′: Here, for any z ∈ A\{x, y}, xPy ⊢{yPz} xPz ⊢{yPx}
yPz ⊢{zPx} yPx.
Proof of (ii): For any pairwise distinct options x, y, z ∈ A, we have xPy ⊢{yPz}
xRz (= ¬zRx), and xRz ⊢{zPy} xPy, in each case properly and irreversibly. 
Proof of Remark 7. Assume classical relevance. Constrained and conditional en-
tailment coincide by Remark 4. This implies the ﬁrst bullet point. The second bullet
point follows from the additional fact that, for any p, q ∈ X,Z ⊆ X, the following are
equivalent (see Dokow and Holzman 2010a for a parallel argument): (i) p irreversibly
constrained (= conditionally) entails q in virtue of Z, i.e., p ⊢Z q while {q}∪Z ⊢ p; (ii)
there is an instance of pair-negatability, i.e., the set Y := {p,¬q} ∪ Z is inconsistent
and becomes consistent if one negates p and/or ¬q. Finally, pathlinkedness implies
proper pathlinkedness, because any path of conditional entailments from a proposi-
tion to its negation must contain at least one properly conditional entailment (as is
well-known since Nehring and Puppe 2002), and because ‘conditional’ is equivalent
to ‘constrained’. 
Proof of Theorem 5. Let the assumptions hold. By Theorem 4, there is a dictator
i. To show that i is a strong dictator, I consider any (J1, ..., Jn) ∈ J
n, and I show
that Ji = F (J1, ..., Jn). Obviously, it suﬃces to show that F (J1, ..., Jn) ⊆ Ji. Suppose
q ∈ F (J1, ..., Jn). By assumption, q is logically equivalent to some J ⊆ {¬p : p ∈ UR}.
For all ¬p ∈ J , we have ¬p ∈ F (J1, ..., Jn) (by q ⊢ ¬p), hence p ∈ F (J1, ..., Jn), and
so p ∈ Ji (as p ∈ UR and i is a dictator), implying that ¬p ∈ Ji. This shows that
J ⊆ Ji. So q ∈ Ji (since J ⊢ q), as desired. 
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